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ABSTRACT
Official government statistics on the "mission—distribution" of
U.S. R&D investment are based on the assumption that only the government
sponsors military R&D. In this paper we advance and test the
alternative hypothesis, that a significant share of privately—financed
industrial R&D is military in orientation. We argue that in addition to
(prior to) contracting with firms to perform military R&D, the
government deliberately encourages firmstosponsor defense research at
their ownexpense,to enable the government to identify the firms most
capable of performing certain government contracts, particularly those
for major weapons systems. To test the hypothesis of, and estimate the
quantity of, private investment in 'signaling' R&D, we estimate variants
of a model of company R&D expenditure on longitudinal, firm—level data,
including detailed data on federal contracts. Ourestimatesimply that
about 30 percent of U.S. private industrial R&D expenditure in 1984 was
procurement— (largely defense—) related, and that almost half of the
increase in private R&D between 1979 and 1984 was stimulated by the
increase in Federal demand.
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The U.S. defense buildup that began in 1979 has intensified the
public debate about the size and rate of growth of the defense budget in
general, and defense-related R&D expenditure in particular. A key issue
in the debate about defense R&D is whether too large or too small a
fraction of the natio&s scientific and technical resources are being
allocated to defense, as opposed to civilian, research. If there were
extensive technological spillovers from defense-oriented research to
civilian-oriented research, the distinction between the two would be
neither very meaningful nor very important. In our view, however, there
is little empirical evidence to support the claim that much recent or
planned military research is likely to benefit civilian technologies.1
Explanations for the low and possibly declining rate of spillover have
been offered by Thurow (1986), among others.
If the tradeoff between the nation's ability to promote military and
civilian technological progress is fairly steep, a correct accounting of
the distribution of national investment in R&D by "mission" (defense vs.
civilian) appears to be a worthwhile objective. I submit that at least
some of the government's official statistics concerning the mission-
distribution of R&D are misleading in this regard. According to data
brief survey of some empirical evidence on the incidence of
spillovers from military to civilian research is presented in Lichten—
berg (1985).2
published by the National Science Board and the National Science Foun-
dation, only the government, and not private industry, sponsors (fi-
nances) defense—related R&D; the private sector sponsors only civilian
R&D. The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoreticalexplanation
for, and to test empirically, the alternative hypothesis, that industrial
contractors sponsor a significant amount of military R&D, due to incen-
tives deliberately provided to them by the government to do so. We also
provide estimates of the quantity (and share) of private R&D investment
that is induced by federal procurement and, hence, is largelymilitary in
orientation.
As we observe in the next section, previous investigators have
provided various kinds of evidence of private investment in R&D oriented
toward defense and other federal government missions. Such investment
occurs because the government establishes rewards for, and subsidizes the
costs of, procurement-related R&D expenditure. What has not, in our
opinion, been adequately explained, is why it is in the government's
interest to encourage this investment. After all, the government can
directly contract with firms to perform R&D on its behalf. The govern-
ment contracted with industrial firms for $20.2 billion worth of R&D in
1983, almot one—third the total value of R&D performed by these firms.
Since it engages in such extensive contracting for R&D services, why does
the government evidently also provide firms with incentives tosponsor
relevant R&D on their own? From a different perspective, under what
conditions might the government seek to induce private investment in a
particular area of R&D, rather than directly contracting for this R&D?
We attempt to provide answers to these questions in Section II of
the paper. Our explanation is based on the assumption that in some cases3
the government has imperfect information about the ability of various
potential contractors to perform a given R&D contract (or other contracts
involving great technical uncertainty). In these cases, the government
invites firms to "signal" their ability to perform the contract: it
sponsors"design and technical competitions." Signaling entails the
utilization of contractors' R&Dpersonneland facilities. For a signal
toeffectively convey information about contractor ability, the cost of
generating the signal (R&D investment) must be at least partially borne
by the prospective contractor, rather than by the government.
In Section III of the paper, we propose an econometric model for
testing the hypothesis that federal procurement in general, and procure-
ment via design and technical competition in general, induces consider-
able private R&D investment. Variants of this model are estimated on
longitudinal, firm—level data on R&D investment, sales, and government
contracts obtained from the Compustat General Annual Industrial File and
the Federal Procurement Data System. In Section IV we report estimates
of the model and compute from them the aggregate quantity (and share in
total R&D investment) of private R&D induced by federal procurement. A
suimnary and concluding remarks are presented in Section V.
II
We begin this section by citing two important pieces of evidence
that a significant share of private R&D investment is defense-related.
We then develop an explanation of why the government seeks to promote
private investment in military R&D, in addition to directly contracting
for such R&D.4
The first piece of evidence consists of budgetary dataon the
government's Independent Research and Development (IR&D) program.2 Under
theprovisionsof this program, DoD and NASA contractors arepermitted to
charge part of the costs of their R&D efforts that are notsupported by
specific contracts as overhead on cost-reimbursement contracts.Major
defense contractors negotiate advanceagreements with these agencies that
impose ceilings on the amount of R&D expense for which contractorscan be
reimbursed. In order for the costs of a project to beeligible for
reimbursement, under the IR&D program, the project must be demonstratedto
have "potential military relevance." Also, in order to haveany of its
R&D expenses reimbursed, a company must have some DoDor NASA contracts.
Major defense contractors reported having incurred total IR&D costs of
$3.9 billion in 1983. This represents about 9.2 percent of NSF's esti-
mate of $42.6 billion for "company and other fundsfor R&D". (i.e.,
non-contract R&D) in industry in 1983. Firms were reimbursed for $1.6
billion (about 40 percent) of this expenditure by DoD and NASA. Accord-
ing to the IR&D budget data, then, firms spent $2.3 billion on projects
with "potential military relevance" for which they were not reimbursedin
1983.
A second type of evidence is provided by Scherer's (1984)analysis
of "linked" R&D and patent data of the largest R&D-performingcompanies.
A team of students supervised by Scherer attempted to classify each of
about 15,000 U.S. patents (obtained by 443 companies between June 1976
and March 1977) by "industry of use,1' i.e., to identify the sector(s) of
2See Reppy (1977) and Winston(1985) for detailed discussions
of the IR&D program.5
the economy in which (most intensive) use of the inventionwas -
anticipated.Scherei "assigned" R&D-expenditures to eachpatent by
assuming that the value of R&D "embodied in" (invested to obtain)any
particular patent was equal to the average R&D expenditureper patent of
the line of business receiving the patent. Thisassignment procedure
enabled classification of R&D expenditures, as wellas of patents, by
industry of use. Two of the industries of use defined by Schererwere
"defense and space operations" and "government,except postal and de-
fense." He estimated the value of company-sponsored R&D "used"by these
sectors to be $1206.3 million and $378.7 million, 1l3 and 3.6percent,
respectively, of the total amount of company-funded R&D ($10.64 billion)
attributed to these companies.3 Thus, according to Scherer's methodo-
logy, the federal government is the primary beneficiary of about 15per-
cent of company-sponsored industrial R&D expenditure. These estimates
are based, of course, on judgments concerning the classification of
patents by industry of use, and on the imputation of "average" R&D ex-
penditures per patent to specific patents.
Thus, both the IR&D budget data and the "linked" patent R&D data
suggest that a non-negligible fraction --onthe order of 10 percent --
ofprivate R&D investment is oriented toward defense or other federal
missions. The econometric evidence presented in the next sectionsug-
gests that the fraction is significantly larger and has increased sub-
stantially in recent years. Before considering that evidence, however,
3These estimates were obtainedusing what Scherer termed the
'1private goods" assumption, according to which a patent (and its associ-
ated R&D expenditure) benefitted (was assigned to) onlyone, rather than
several, industries of use.6
we seek to explain why the government provides financial incentives for
firms to sponsor such research, in addition to, or instead of, directly
contracting with them. As anticipated above, our explanation is based on
thepremise that the goverment has imperfect information about the
ability of potential contractors to perform specific R&D projects.
Theidea that the government's information in the context of R&D
contracting is incomplete is not a novel one. Rogerson (1984) developed
a theory of optimal R&D contracting predicated on the assumption that it
is costly or infeasible for the government to monitor either the outcome
of a project performed by a contractor (i.e., how "successful" the
project was in achieving its objectives) or the effort (expense) invested
in the project. Rogerson argued that if it is difficult for thegovern-
ment to observe the outcome of the project, and if the financial reward
to the contractor is greater if he reports a successful outcome than if
he reports an unsuccessful one, then the contractor has an incentive to
misrepresent the outcome, i.e., to overstate the degree of success. In
practice, a contractor is likely to earn higher rewards if he reports a
successful outcome; in particular, he is likely to be awarded "followon"
contracts for further development, and possibly also for production,
training, maintenance, spare parts, and so forth. To eliminate the
contractor's incentive to distort the outcome of the project, the govern-
ment could offer a fixed fee for performance of R&D contracts, i.e.
,a
reward that is independent of the reported outcome. (Presumably, under
this scheme follow-on contracts would not be awarded to the R&D perform-
er, even if the project were a success.) However, this mode of contract-
ing suffers from a number of defects, one of which arises for the
following reason. Suppose, as Rogerson does, that the government has7
difficulty monitoring contractor effort. Assume that the probability of
a successful outcome increases with the quantity of effort. If the
contractor's reward does not depend upon the reported outcome, the
contractor maximizes his net income by expending minimum possible (per-
haps zero) effort on the project, and by (truthfully) reporting failure.
As Rogerson observes, the difficult problem facing the government is to
design an optimal contract that "achieves a balance between the three
competing concerns of inducing effort, inducing truthful revelation, and
allocating risk:'4
The work of Rogerson and others on optimal R&D contracting addresses
the important problem of how the government should contract with a
specific firm, given the difficulty of monitoring the effort on or
outcome of the project. But due to its incomplete information, the
government faces an additional difficulty, one that is logically prior to
that of writing an optimal contract: choosing the right firm with which
to contract. We assume that both R&D projects and prospective R&D
contractors (firms) are heterogeneous: some firms are more qualified to
perform a given R&D project than other firms. By more qualified, I mean
that they will have a higher probability of success from a given effort,
or will require less effort to achieve a given probability of success.
In the case of some projects, the government may know (or at least
believe that it knows) the identity of a firmthatis best qualified to
perform the project. In these situations the government may contract
with the finn it has identified on a noncompetitive basis. Only about 30
percent of the value of DoD R&D contracts are awarded on this basis,
4Rogerson (1984), p. 4.8
however.5 In thecase of the remaining 70 percent of R&D contracting,
the government does not know (although itmay have subjective probabili-
ty beliefs concerning) which of a relatively small number of finns is
best qualified to perform the contract. Howcan the government discover
the identity of the firm most capable ofperforming the contract?
The market for government R&D contracts is byno means the only
market in which the buyer has imperfect information about thequality
of products or services offered by different sellers.Employers have
incomplete knowledge of the ability of (hence the quality of labor
services provided by) job applicants; consumers are uncertain about the
quality of various brands of a product. A number of theoretical models
of markets characterized by this kind of imperfect information show that
it is equilibrium behavior for sellers to invest inacquiring, and for
buyers to rely on, signals of quality and ability. Spence (1974) has
argued that employers may use information about job applicants' invest-
ments in education as signals of their underlying ability, and thus make
wage offers on the basis of educational attainment. Kihistrom and
Riordan (1984), developing ideas advanced by Nelson,argue that adver-
tising expenditures may signal unobservable product quality to con-
sumers. We hypothesize that prospective federal contractors signal
their ability to perform R&D and related contracts by producing elabor-
ate technical proposals, which entails utilization of R&D personnel and
facilities. In order to demonstrate the applicability of the signaling
5The 30percent figure reflects our treatment of follow-on awards after
design and technical competition as competitive contracts. Although
these contracts are officially classified as noncompetitive, since they
are awarded to the winner of design and technical competitions, we
regard them as being awarded on a competitive basis.9
concept to the market for government R&D contracts, it is useful to
briefly review Spence's model of job market signaling. We then descibe
the government's principal method of awarding R&Dcontracts, procurement
by design and technical competition. We postulate that thegovernment
sponsors these competitions in order to encourage contractor signaling.
Spence hypothesizes that employers are willing to make highwage
offers to high—ability job applicants, and low offers to low—ability
applicants, but that employers cannot directly observe applicant ability.
In the absence of that information, employersmay make wage offers to
applicants based on the value of an observable atttribute which, they
believe, signals ability. Spence argued that for an attribute to func-
tion as a signal of ability, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) the
value of the attribute must be subject to the applicantscontrol; (2) it
must be costly (to the applicant) to increase the value of the attribute;
and (3) the cost of increasing the value of the attribute must be lower
for applicants of higher ability.6 Spence hypothesized that educational
attainment functions as a signal of ability in the job market. Employers
make subjective evaluations of job applicants' ability (and hence make
wage offers) on the basis of the quantity of investment in education
applicants have made: higher wage offers are made to individuals with
more education. High-ability workers find it worthwhile to invest in
education in order to secure higher wage offers, but due to their higher
costs of acquiring education, low-ability workers do not. An interesting
6lnstead of assumingasymmetry of costs of signalling (and equality
of returns), Xihlstrom and Riordan assume asymmetry of returns --greater
returns to signalling by the high-quality seller --andequality of
costs.10
feature of signalling models is that multiple equilibria often exist:any
of a number of initial employer beliefs (about the relationship between
the value of the signal and ability) may be self-confirming. Some of the
equilibria may be Pareto-inferior to others. In the signalling model
(high-ability) individuals invest in education not because it increases
their productivity (which is the motive for investment in education
according to human capital theory) but "merely' because it signals their
(exogenously) higher productivity. It is true that the social rate of
return to educational investment will be positive if signalling improves
the allocation of applicants to jobs, placing high-ability individuals in
jobs requiring high ability, and conversely. But the private rate of
return is likely to exceed, perhaps by a substantial amount, the social
rate of return, resulting in significant overinvestment in education.
Let us return to consider the problem of government selection of an
R&D contractor under uncertainty about contractor qualifications. When
the government is (initially) unable to identify the most qualified
contractor, it sponsors something called a design and technical competi-
tion. The following is a brief characterization of of the modus operandi
of design and technical competitions; a signaling interpretation of
these competitions is provided below. The competition begins "official-
ly" when a federal agency (DoD or NASA) issues a formal Request for
Proposals (RIP). Many analysts have noted, hoiiever, that potential
contractors are aware of the government's interest in particular areas of
technology, and attempt to influence the "shape" of government demand for
innovations, long before the publication of REP's. Indeed, a contractor
who first learned about a project from an REP would be effectively out of
the running for that project. Danhof has observed that "it is an impor—11
tant part of the contractual process that the firm'srepresentatives
participate in the informal discussions that long precede theestablish-
ment of requirements and in the debate as alternativesare narrowed.1'
In the case of DoD procurement, the mean and mediannumber of firms
to submit proposals in response to-an RIP is about threeor four. In
four of the seven (presumably "representative") DoDcompetitions consid-
ered by Fox, three firms submitted proposals; in two ofthe competitions,
four firms did, and in one competition, seven firms.Danhof notes that
about one out of four competitive proposals foraerospace (DoD) contracts
is successful. About one of every nine bids forcompetitive NASA con-
tracts is successful.
In view of the fact that the Rip's are on the order of 1100to 2500
pages in length, it is perhaps not suprising that the typical proposal
ranges in length from 23,000 to 38,000 pages. The five proposals submit-
ted under the C-IA program totalled 240,000pages. The proposals gener-
ally consist of three main sections. The technical section is the
largest, comprising about two-thirds of the total proposal. In this
section, the company explains how it plans to meet the performance
specifications set forth in the RIP. In the management section, the
company attempts to convince the govermnent that it has the necessary
manpower and the appropriate management and control techniques to suc-
cessfully perform the project. Cost estimates and supporting documenta-
tion are presented in the cost section of the proposal.
Once the proposals for a given procurement program have been submit-
ted, an elaborate review process begins. Various committees assign
"scores" to numerous aspects of each company's proposal, and the individ-
ual scores are combined using a predetermined set of weights. Proposal12
evaluation appears generally to take about three months, during which
time tens of thousands of government-employee manhours are engaged in the
"source-selection" process. The firm that submits the proposalreceiving
the highest score is generally awarded the contract.
We believe that it is both natural and useful to interpretdesign
and technical competitions as signaling phenomena. The signal of
contractor ability to perform the contract that the government relies on
is the score on the technical proposal. Each firm has its own (possibly
stochastic) "score cost function" (and a dual "score production func-
tion") that relates the cost of preparing the proposal to the (expected)
score to be received by the proposal. We hypothesize that there are
positive and increasing marginal costs of improvements in the score.
Following the logic of the Spence model, in order for the score on the
proposal to effectively signal ability to perform, two additional condi-
tions must be satisfied. First, the cost of preparing a proposal ofany
given score must be lowest for the most capable contractor. That this
should be the case seems quite plausible. Second, the cost of preparing
the proposal must be at least partially borne by the contractor. The
government could, after all, contract with finns to produce proposals.
But if all costs of proposal preparation were borne by the government,
proposals would not effectively convey information about contractor
ability. Evidently, contractors must place some of their own resources
"at risk" if they are to demonstrate their capability to the government.
Although it would be inappropriate for the government to underwite all
contractor costs of proposal preparation, it might be appropriate for it
to subsidize such expenditures if it believed contractors would under-13
invest in signaling in the absence of subsidies.7 Theexistence of the
Th&D program, which, we indicated above, subsidizesprivate military
research expenditure, might perhaps be justifiedon these grounds:
without IR&D reimbursements, design and technicalcompetitions might
yield an insufficient quantity of information about contractor ability.8
We have argued that the governmentsponsors design and technical
competitions, which elicit signaling investments by potential contrac-
tors, in order to acquire information about contractor qualifications to
provide R&D and related services and products. There is, however,an
alternative hypothesis that could account for the government'suse of
this method of procurement. According to this view, federalagencies
sponsor these competitions not in order to acquire information about
contractor ability --theyknow in advance of the competition which firm
they want to hire --butin order to impress (or signal) Congress that
they are committed to competition in procurement. Judging from the
periodic Congressional hearings and reports on the subject (see, for
example, U.S. Congress (1969)), there is strong Congressional demand for
competition in procurement, and procurement officals must pursue polices
that at least appear to be consistent with this objective.
7The sociallyoptimal (efficient) quantity of signaling investment
is the quantity at which the marginal (expected) benefit (assumed to be
diminishing) of the information transmitted equals the marginal cost
(assumedto be increasing) of transmitting the information. The mar-
ginal benefit is measured in terms of the increase in the probability of
choosingthe most qualified firm, and the increase in the probability of
success (or reduction in costs) resulting from choosing the most
qualified firm.
81f the rate ofsubsidy varies across firms, as it appears to do
under the IR&D program, it is important that it not be very negatively
correlated with contractor ability. If the least capable firms receive14
Roberts (1964) has argued that, in practice, source selection does
not operate according to the three tenets of official procurement
policy: (1) maximum competition; (2) objective (numerical) proposal
evaluation; and (3) independent, multilevel review. With regard to the
second two principles, he notes first that scores on technicalproposals
essentially reflect evaluators' prior beliefs about contractor ability,
and are scarcely influenced by the merits of the proposal. He also
observes that there are strong political pressures for higher—level
reviews of source-selection decisions to endorse (rubber-stamp) the
actions of lower—level reviews. But his analysis of a sample of 41 DoD
R&D contract awards does not suggest an absence of competition in the
case of most contracts. That there is generally effective competition
is implied by the following data. The technical initiator ofan R&D
project typically provides a list of "recommended firms" for thepro-
ject. Edwards reports the following distribution of 41 R&D contracts,
by number of recommended companies:






Thus, at least two firms were recommended in the case of 35 out of 41
(85 percent) of the contracts; at least four firms in the case of 63
the largest subsidies, they might be most likely to produce winning
proposals.15
percent.9 Moreover, overall mare than twiceas many companies were
solicited by the agency to submit proposals as were recommendedby the
technical initiator. An average of seven firms competed for contracts
when only one firm was recommended; between 10 and 40companies were
solicited when two or three were recommended.
Of course, even if procurement officials know in advance which firm
they want to perform the contract, and sponsor the design and technical
competition merely to appease Congressional demand for (the appearance
of) competition, unless firms also know that the outcome is predeter-
mined, the competition would still be expected to elicit substantial R&D
investment. And even if a firm is aware of its status as the "desired
sole source" for a project (i.e., it is the only recommended firm), the
firm may (correctly) perceive that it is required to submit arespect-
able technical proposal. Although desired sole sources are normally
awarded the contract, Edwards cites a case in which a desired sole
source lost because it "insulted the agency by sending in an 'advertis-
ing brochure.' Evidently, even a company that is 'in' can sometimes get
too cocky," i.e., not devote sufficient effort to proposal development.
We conclude this section by briefly reviewing some case-study and
anecdotal evidence regarding private R&D investment in pursuit of govern-
ment contracts. Edwards describes an unpublished study by Thomas Allen
at lilT of companies' proposal efforts related to 14 small ($30—$50
thousand) R&D contract awards. Allen found the total cost of all com-
pany proposal efforts in each competition ranged from 3 to 150 percent
9Edwards notes, however, that the lists of recommended firmswere
often not in alphabetical order, suggesting that procurement officials
may have favored a subset of recoimnended firms.16
of the direct cost of the contract awarded. Total proposal effort
appeared to be related more to the number of bidders than to the value
of the contract. Another study of 36 firms bidding fora single large
R&D contract estimated that each bidder spent three to four thousand
engineering manhours on its proposal. The estimated combined 45 to 60
engineering man—years reflects effort only at the prime contractor level;
subcontractors must also generate technical data for prime contractors.
Estimates of the amount of R&D investment made by single firms in
specific periods or competitions have occasionally been reported. Gorgol
noted that "the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was estimated to havespent
about $75 million of its own money in the period 1964-66 toimprove its
competitive position in relation to the contract possibilities it viewed
as likely to materialize. For example, more than 1000 employees were
working on the C-5A proposal."1° Lockheed continues to make such invest-
ments today: according to one of its vice presidents, Lockheed spent "in
the low hundreds of millions of dollars," and assigned hundreds of its
most able managers and technicians to research on the Advanced Technical
Fighter, prior to submitting (along with six other companies) a 3000-page
technical proposal for the aircraft project in February 1986.11 Competi-
tion for "Star Wars" (Strategic Defense Initiative) research contracts
has also elicited company R&D investment. In 1984, the government's
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization "challenged companies to enter
10Gorgol (1972), p. 33.
New York Times (1986)17
what it called a horse race to devise the best Star Warsblueprint. A
herd of 300 firms submitted initial applications, but SOlO narrowedthe
field to five, each of which will receive a $5 milliongrant to work on
its designs." According to the head of GTE's Star Warseffort, "the
price of admission to this game is much higher than usual." GTEnormally
Lays out between $100,000 and $1 million of its own funds to developa
bid for a research grant, but as of October 1985 it hadspent about $3
million on Star Wars proposals.'2
While the anecdotal evidence is certainly consistent withour
hypothesis of private investment in R&D to signal ability to perform
government contracts, it is not adequate for formally testing the hypoth-
esis or for estimating the quantity (and share) of private R&D investment
undertaken for this purpose. A basis for formal testing and estimation
is provided, however, by the econometric model presented in the next
section.
III
In this section we propose an econometric methodology for testing
the hypothesis of, and estixnatingthe quantity of, private investment in
R&D to signal ability to perform government contracts. The methodology
we propose is a generalization and extension of that used in previous
investigations of the reduced-form relationship between company R&D
expenditure (or other measures of innovative activity such as patents)
and sales (or other measures of firm size such as assets).
12 .TimeMagazine (1985).18
If one is willing to regard a finn-size variable such as sales as a
proxy for the extent of a firm's market (or growth in sales as a proxy
for growth in demand for the firm's products-cum-innovations), then the
"indivisibility"property of innovations suggests that innovative activi-
tyshould be an increasing function of firm size. As Kamien and Schwartz
(1982) observe, development costs are fixed costs, independent of the
number of units of output produced, whereas more revenue is collected if
output is larger. Hence, the larger the market, the greater the number
of process and product improvements that are likely to appear profitable.
The objective of most previous studies of the relationship between
inputs or outputs of innovative activity and firm size has been to test
the Schumpeterian hypothesis that large firms tend to sponsor a dispro-
portionate amount of innovation. In perhaps the most recent such study,
Bound et al. (1984) computed regressions of the log of R&D expenditure
on the log of sales and its square or the log of gross plant, using
cross-sectional data for 1479 firms. They concluded that both very small
and very large firms are more R&D intensive than average-size firms, and
rejected the existence of any significant R&D threshold.
We are interested in investigating the effect of the composition, as
opposed to the size, of demand for a firm's products on its R&D intensi-
ty, or propensity to sponsor R&D. A firm's total sales may be inter-
preted as the sum of its sales to each of its customers. In particular,
it is the sum of its sales to the federal government (G0V) and to other
customers (0Th). A regression equation of company R&D expenditure (CRD)
on total sales (SALES) embodies the a priori restriction that government
and other sales have the same effect on R&D expenditure. The most
important respect in which we extend and generalize previous econometric19
studies of the determinants of privfle R&D investment is byrelaxing this
restriction, by classifying (disaggregating) SALES into its components
GOV and 0TH, and subclassifying GOY by method ofprocurement (competitive
vs. other) and by commodity (R&D vs. other). By disaggregating sales in
this manner; we purport to determine the extent to whichgovernment
procurement in general, and procurement via design and technical competi-
tion in particular, stimulates private R&D investment.
In order to get consistent estimates of the (relative) effects of
government and nongovernment demand on private R&D investment, we believe
that two additional methodological extensions arenecessary. The first
involves testing for the presence of correlated firm- (and year-) effects
by computing both random—effects and fixed-effects estimates of the
following model.using longitudinal, firm-level data:
(1) Cli]).=i.X..÷ a. + cS+u, it.jJ].t 1tit
3. i1, ...,N
t1,...,T
where CRD. represents company-sponsored R&D expenditure of firm i in
year t, and X.. represents sales of type jbyfirmiin year t. The
individual (firm) effects a. reflect the influence of all unobserved
time—invariant, firm—specific determinants, whereas the year effects
capture the effects of changes over time in unmeasured determinants of
CRD whichare common to all firms. It is well known that there are two
basic approaches to the estimation of model (1): "random effects" estima-
tion and "fixed effects" estimation. In the random effects framework,
the values of the individual and year effects are regarded as realiza-
tions of a random variable assumed to be distributed independently of the20
regressors and of u. .Inthe fixed-effects framework, the a. and 6 it 1 t
are regarded as unknown parameters to be estimated. Under the null
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with theregres-
sors, the random effects (RE) estimator is both consistent andasymptoti-
cally efficient, while the fixed effects (FE) estimator isconsistent
but inefficient. Under the alternative hypothesis ofcorrelated indivi-
dual effects, only the FE estimator is consistent.Clearly, which esti-
mator should be chosen depends upon whether or not the nullhypothesis
is true. Fortunately, }Iausman (1978) hasdeveloped a test for determin-
ing whether we should reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis.The
test statistic is a measure of the distance between the FE andRE esti-
mates; large values of this statistic should cause us to reject the
null, and therefore to regard only the FE estimates as consistent. All
of the models considered below were estimated by both RE andFE, and the
ilausman test statistic based on the difference between theseestimates
was computed; in every case, the null hypothesis was decisivelyreject-
ed. This is not very surprising since, as }fausman and others havenot-
ed, unobserved individual effects are unlikely, in general, to beuncor-
related with the regressors. In view of these findings,we report in
Section IV only FE ("within-firm") estimates.
The second econometric extension thatmay be required to obtain
consistent parameter estimates is estimation of the (fixed-effects) model
by instrumental variables (IV) rather than by ordinary leastsquares
(OLS). There are at least two reasons why one mightexpect OLS estimates
of equation (1) to be inconsistent: simultaneous—equationsbias, and
errors-in—variables. The consistency of OLS estimates is predicatedon
the assumption that a firm's sales isexogenous relative to its R&D21
expenditure. Although Mairesse and Siu (1984) were unable toreject the
hypothesis that (total) sales is exogenous withrespect to R&D, in view
of our above characterization of design and technicalcompetitions, it is
quite plausible that the part of a firm's sales accounted forby govern-
ment contracts (at least those awarded by design andtechnical competi-
tion) is partly determined by its (current or past) R&Dexpenditure.
Thus, although total sales appears to beexogenous, it is unlikely that
the (typically relatively small) government-salescomponent is.
Errors-in-variables (or, equivalently, errors inclassifying firm
sales into government and nongovernmeut components) arisemainly because,
as discussed below, "government sales" is defined, perforce,as the value
of federal prime contract actions (obligations)by firm and year. Error
may result from both the fact that we are treating obligations as sales
and from inability to account for subcontracting. There isa question as
towhen federal contract actions are "recognized" asrevenue (sales) by
the firm's accountants. We assume, in the absence of reliableinforma-
tionon this issue, that contract actions during a given year are re-
flected in that year1s sales figure. With regard tosubcontracting, it
might be argued that subcontracting should be taken into account when
classifying the firm's sales by customer. It might be desirable, for
example, topartition the firm's sales into three components: sales
directly to the government of products produced by the firm (i.e., prime
contract awards minus subcontracts awarded to other firms); sales indi-
rectly to the government (i.e., subcontracts awarded under other firms'
prime contracts); and nongovernment sales. This kind of disaggregation
would enable us to assess the extent of private R&D investment undertaken
in pursuit of subcontracts. Unfortunately, there are at present no22
comprehensive and reliable data on the incidence of subcontracting at the
firm level.13 DoD data suggest that at least 38 percent of the value of
prime contracts awarded to business firms is subcontracted.14
Let us briefly consider the consequences for our parameter estimates
likely to result from errors in measuring government sales and, hence, in
classifying total sales (assumed to be measured without error) into its
components. First, because, as discussed above, the Hausman specifica-
tion test indicated that the fixed-effects model was appropriate, we have
adopted the "within-firm" estimator. Within this estimation framework
(at least certain kinds of) "permanent" errors in measuring a firm's
government sales are likely to be inconsequential; they will be absorbed
by the individual effect for that firm. If we assume that the non-
permanent component of the measurement error has the usual classical
properties (i.e., uncorrelated with the "true" regressors and with the
disturbance term), then a result reported by Griliches concerning the
effect of measurement error in a multiple regression implies that the
difference between the coefficients on government and nongovernment sales
should be biased toward zero.15
13The Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council iscurrently considering
an amendment to the DoD acquisition regulations that would require
large prime contractors to submit quarterly statistical reports on
first—tier contracting.
l4See Department of Defense (1985),p. 81.
15This result can be establishedas follows. Suppose the true model
may be expressed as
Y = +p222 + U23
We attempt to address the problems posed by bothpotential
endogeneity of government sales and errors in measuringgovernment sales
by computing instrumental-variable estimates (usingputatively exogenous
instruments for government sales), as well as OLSestimates, of our model
of private R&D investment. A statisticmeasuring the distance between
the OLS and IV estimates may be computed to test the nullhypothesis that
the assumptions required for consistency of the OLS estimator(i.e.,
government sales exogenous and measured without error) are satisfied.
In view of the fact that we are trying tomeasure the effect of
exogenous shifts in the government's demand for each firm's products—
cum-innovations, the instrument for firm i's actual government contracts
in year tisan an estimate of its potential contracts in that year.
Potential contracts is defined as the total (across all firms) value in
year t of government contracts for two-digit FSC (Federal Supply Code)
products and services that the firmeversold to the government during
where y denotes company R&Dexpenditure,z1 denotes true government
sales, z2 denotes true nongovernment sales, and all variables are mea-
sured as deviations from firmmeans.This model may be rewritten as
y =( - +22 ÷U
=y2j+D2z+u
where z E +z2denotes total sales, and y E -P2-Suppose 21is
not observed but we observe a noisy indicator of 2j, x, related to it by
where c is a classical measurement error assumed to be uncorrelated with
all other variables. Griliches shows that plim(b -y)=yA/(1-
whereX var(t)/var(x) and p is the sample correY*tion coefficient
between x and z. Thus, the least squares estimate of y is biased toward
zero (estimates of and f2 are biased toward equality). Also, provided
that p >0(which is true for our sample), the bias is "transmitted,"
with an opposite sign, to the other coefficient:Plim(byz.x -Pt)=
-p[biasy]. See Griliches (1984), pp. 22-23.24
the sample period 1979-1985. Thismay be expressed algebraically as
follows:
POT. =i13. .*AGG. it jj
where 13.. = 1if firmiever sold product j to the government
during the period 1979—1985;
= 0otherwise
AGGit =total(across firms) value of government contracts
for product j in year t.
In order for POT. to be a valid instrument for GUy, in the GRID it it
equation, the variables on the BBS of (2) should be exogenous relative to
CRD. It seems reasonable to maintain that this is thecase, i.e., that
neither the lines of business the firm was engaged in, nor theaggregate
volume of government procurement in those markets, was determinedby the
16 firm s rate of R&D investment.
Testing certain hypotheses requires that we disaggregate government
sales into various components, e.g., R&D and non—R&D. In order to have
as many instruments as there are government-sales variables, the poten-
tial contracts variable is disaggregated into components in exactly the
same way as the (actual) contracts variable.. For example, potential
contracts is divided into potential R&D contracts and potential non—R&D
contracts, and these are used as instruments for actual R&D and non-R&D
contracts, respectively.
16Obviously, using POT as an instrument is similar tousing industry
dummy variables as instruments, albeit in highly restricted form.25
In the remainder of this section we provide a briefdescription of
the data sources and procedures we have used todevelop a data base
suitable for estimation of the model outlined above. We haveconstructed
a panel consisting of annual observations on company R&Dexpenditure,
total sales, and government sales, for each of 187 firmsduring the years
1979-1984. Data on company sponsored R&D expenditure andon total sales
of the company are taken from the Compustat General Annual Industrial
File. Data on sales to the federal government (moreprecisely, on the
net value of obligations to the firm under federal contract actions)are
derived from the Federal Procurement Data System. The samplewas con-
structed as follows. The Federal Procurement Data Center (FPDC)provided
to the author a computer tape containing records of all federal (prime)
contract actions of the 1500 industrial firms who had the largest total
value of contracts during 1979-1984 (FPDC began operation in 1979). This
tape contained records of almost 1.3 million contract actions. Each
record indicates the month in which the contract action occurred, and the
contract actions for each firm were aggregated to the annual level. We
then matched the federal contract data, by firm andyear, to the corre-
sponding data on sales and company-sponsored R&D from the Compustat file.
The Compustat file included data for only 187 out of the 1500 firms,many
of which are not publicly traded companies. The firms that are included
in both the FPDC and Compustat files (and therefore in our sample),
though, tend to be the largest firms, measured either by CRD, sales, or
value of federal contracts.
Table 1 presents summary statistics, by year, for our sample of
firms, and, for purposes of comparison, selected published U.S. aggregate
time-series. Total sample values of four data items --company-spon-Table 1
SAMPLE AGGREGATESANDCOMPARISONNATIONAL DATA
(allamounts in billions of dollars)
AGGREGATES FOR SAMPLEOF187 FIRMS
COMPANY-
SPONSORED VALUE OF VALUE OF
R&D FEDERAL FEDERAL
YEAR EXPENDITURE SALES CONTRACTS R&D CONTRACTS
1979 17.8 748.3 41.1 7.8
1980 20.7 826.3 46.6 8.5
1981 23.6 908.4 56.8 9.2
1982 26.4 898.9 72.7
1983 29.0 931.2 79.3 15.0




FUNDS FOLD CONTRACT FUNDS FO
YEAR8 R&D" SALESC AWARDSd
R&D"
1979 25.7 1215.0 58..5 12.5
1980 30.5 1354.0 66.7 14.0
1981 35.4 87.2 16.4
1982 39.5 102.5 18.5
1983 42.6 121.1 20.2
1984 124.9
aAll data except DoD contracts on calendar-yearbasis; contract awards
on fiscal—year basis.
bsource. NSF, R&D inIndustry
CNet sales of R&D performang manufacturingcompanies.
dDOD Prime Contract Awards to Businessesfor Work in the U.S.
Source: DoD Prime Contract Awards Fiscal Year 1984, Table 3.
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sored R&D, sales, value of federal contractactions, and value of R&D
contract actions —-areshown. In 1983, these 187 firms reporteda total
of about $29 billion of company-sponsored R&Dexpenditure, or about 68
percent of NSF's estimate of U.S. aggregate industrial R&D expenditure.17
The value of federal obligations to these firmsfor R&D was about $15
billion in 1983, which is 74 percent of NSF's estimateof federal funds
for industrial R&D. The share of federal R&D intotal (company +fed-
eral) industrial R&D expenditure is about a third in bothsample and
national data.
Recall that the method of contracting hypothesized to elicit(the
most intense) private R&D investment is procurementby design and techni-
cal competition. Unfortunately, while the FPDS data dodistinguish
negotiated competitive procurement from other methods ofcontracting
(e.g., negotiated noncompetitive or formally advertisedprocurement),
they do not distinguish between the two principal methods ofnegotiated
competitive procurement: price competition, and design and technical
competition. Moreover, as the summarydatapublished by DoD presented in
Table 2 indicate, design and technical competitions account foronly
about one-fourth of the value of negotiated competitive contracts.'8By
17Becausecompany R&D expenditures that are reimbursed under the IR&D
program are included in the NSF estimate but evidently excluded from the
Compustat (10K-based) data, this fraction may understate the true share
of these companies in national R&D expenditure.
18Although under 10percent of the value of DoD contracts are
officially recorded as competitive contracts awarded on the basis of
design and technical competition, an additional 27 percent are designated
"follow—on"contracts after design and technical competition, awarded on
a nonompetitive basis to the winner of the competition. Hence in
reality37 percent of the value of DoD contracts are awarded, initially
or eventually, on the basis of these competitions.28
Table 2
Distribution of DoD FY1984 Negotiated
Competitive and Noncompetitive Procurement, by Method
(All figures in billions of dollars)
All R&D
Method of Procurement contracts contracts'
Competitive
Design and technical competition 11.6 4.4
Price competition 35.0 0.4
Follow—on after Competition
After design and technical competition 31.6 4.6
After price competition 4.1 0.1
Noncompetitive 34.3 3.9
Catalog or market price 0.9
Total, all methods 117.6 13.4
1 ... Seetext for definition of R&D contracts for purposes of this table.
*less than $0.05 billion.29
cross-classifying contracts by whether or not theyare competitive and by
whether or not they are for R&D,however, we can isolate one class of
contracts --i.e.,competitive R&D contracts --whichare awarded almost
entirely on the basis of design and technical competition.19
Thus if, as
we hypothesize, design and technicalcompetitions provide the greatest
stimulus to private R&D investment,competitive R&D contracts should have
the largest coefficient of the contracttypes which we can identify,
given the data available to us. Since aboutone-fourth of competitive
non-R&D contracts are awarded by design andtechnical competition, the
coefficient on this category would beexpected to be smaller in magnitude
but still positive, and larger than thecoefficients on other (follow-on
and noncompetitive) contracts (whetheror not for R&D), which are not
awarded (at least directly) on the basis ofa design and technical
competition.
Finally, before turning to our parameterestimates, we thought it
might be of interest to present data on the distributionof design and
technical competition awards by product and service.These data provide
an indication of the product fields in which the hypothesizedcompany-
sponsored signaling R&D is concentrated. Due to the data limitations
cited above (i.e., inability to distinguishprice competition from de-
19The distribution ofcontracts by method shown in the second column
of Table 2 reflects the distribution of contracts whichcite statutory
authority 10 U.S.C. 2304(4)(ll) ("experimental, developmental,test, or
research") as their authorization for exception to therequirement for
formal advertising. Whenever procurement officialswish to employ any
method of procurement other than formal advertising,they must cite one
of 17 possible reasons for not advertising enumerated inthe U.S. Code.
The eleventh such reason is that they arecontracting for experimental,
developmental, test, or research services. Contracts citing thisreason
aretreated as tR&D contracts" for thepurposes of Table 2.30
sign and technical competition), we present data on the distribution of
follow-on contracts (almost 90 percent of which follow design and tech-
nical competitions) rather than that of competitive contracts.2° A list
of the top 25 (4-digit Federal Supply Code) products and services,
ranked by value of follow-on contracts, is presented in Table 3.These
products and services account for over three-fourths of the total value
of follow-on contracts. Not surprisingly, virtually all of these prod-
ucts and services are defense- and space-related.
Iv
Inthis section we present and interpret estimates of the model of
company R&D expenditures developed in the previous section. OLS and IV
estimates of the fixed-effects version of equation (1) are presented in
Table 4. We begin by disaggregating SALES into only two components:
government contracts (sales), and nongoverrunent sales. In column (la),
OLS estimates of the regression of ORD on GOV and 0Th are reported. The
coefficient on GOV is about 2.26 times as large as the coefficient on
0Th; moreover, the difference between these two coefficients is highly
statistically significant.21 IV estimates of the same model, using
20We note, however, thatover 90 percent of the value of competitive
R&D contracts are for defense and space R&D.
21The ratio of coefficients is similarto (slightly smaller than)
that obtained when a similar equation was estimated on panel data for 88
business segments (lines of business) observed annually during the period
1978—1983. The ratio estimated from those data (derived from the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































"potential government sales" as an instrument for actualgovernment
sales, are presented in column lb. The coefficienton 0Th is unchanged
by using an instrument for GUy, but the IV estimate of the GO'?coeffici-
exit is almost twice as large as the OLS estimate.The IV estimates
imply that a dollar of government demand (sales) inducesover four times
as much R&D expenditure as a dollar of rzongovernment demand.
We performed the instrumental—variables test forerrors-in—variables
discussed by Hausman (1978), by running theregression of ORB on GUy,
0TH, and the residual from the regression of GOV on its instrument
(potential contracts). The coefficient on this residualwas signifi-
cantly different from zero (t =2.7),indicating that we should reject
the null hypothesis that GOV is measured withouterror (or, more general-
ly, is uncorrelated with the disturbance). Consequently, only the IV
estimates should be regarded as consistent.
We can use these coefficients to estimate the totalquantity of
private R&D expenditure induced by government sales; this estimatemay be
considered in relation to three different measures of R&D investment:(1)
the quantity of private R&D expenditure induced by sales of alltypes;
(2) the quantity of federal contract R&D; and (3) thequantity of IR&D
investment. The quantity of private R&D investment inducedby sales of a
particular type is calculated as total sales of that type times the
estimated (IV) coefficient on that type of sales. Estimates of the
quantity of private R&D induced by both government and nongovernment
sales are presented in Table 5. As indicated, the estimated share of
government-sales-induced R&D expenditure in total induced R&D expenditure
increased from 19.8 percent in 1979 to 28.7 percent in 1984.Moreover,Table 4
OLS and IV Estimates of "Within" Regressions
of Private R&DExpenditureon Sales Classified by Type
Annual Data 1979-1984 for 187 Firms
Ct—ratios in parentheses)
Column la lb 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b
Estimation










































































Sum ofSquared 5568 5561 5482 5315
Residuals/ 1000
Residual Degrees928 927 927 925
of Freedom
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almost half (48.7 percent) of the increase in total induced R&Dexpendi-
ture during this period was induced by the increase ingovernment sales.
Our estimates of government-sales-induced CRD investment, considered
in relation to contract R&D expenditure, suggest that there isslightly
more than 50 cent& worth of private, procurement-related R&D investment
for every dollar of contract R&D. Stated differently, about one-thirdof
the industrial R&D investment associated with governmentprocurement is
privately financed.
Because data on IR&D costs and reimbursements are availableonly at
the national level, in order to compare government-sales-induced ORB
expenditures to IR&D outlays, we need to estimate the former for the
country as a whole, not merely for the sample of 187 firms. We do this
by multiplying the government-sales coefficient (.098) by theaggregate
value of DoD prime contract awards. (Because DoD accounts foronly about
80 percent of the total value of federal procurement, this isprobably a
conservative estimate of the amount of private R&D investment induced by
total federal procurement.) As indicated in Table 6, the resulting
estimates of aggregate CRD expenditure induced by DoD prime contract
awards are $5.7 billion in 1979 and $11.9 billion in 1983 (the lastyear
for which we have IR&D data). These figures are about three timesas
large as the corresponding estimates of total IR&O costs incurred by
industry ($2.1 and $3.9 billion, respectively). Moreover, the CRD-
expenditure data upon which our estimate of the government-sales coef-
ficient is based evidently exclude IR&D costs for which companies are
reimbursed by DoD or NASA. These agencies typically reimburse about 40
percent of IR&D costs incurred. Hence it is to the total IR&D costs not
reimbursed by federal agencies that our estimates of government-sales-35
Table 5
Calculation of Share of Government—Sales-Induced
CRD Expenditure in Total Induced CR0 Expenditure
Year Change,
Line Description* 1979 1984 1979 to 1984
(1) Total government sales 41.1 85.8 44.7
(2) Total nongovernment sales 707.7 908.3 200.6
(3) Government-sales—induced
CRD expenditure (.098 '
Line(1)) 4.03 8.41 4.38
(4) Nongoverninent-sales-induced
CR0 expenditure (.023
Line (2)) 16.28 20.89 4.61
(5) Total Induced CRD Expend-
iture (Line (3) +Line(4)) 20.31 29.30 9.99
(6) Share of Government-sales-
inducedCR1)expenditure in
Totalinduced CR0expendi-
ture (Line (3)Line(S)) 19.8% 28.7% 48.7%
*Allfigures except those in line (6) in billions of dollars.36
induced private R&D expenditure ought to becompared. As the comparison
of the second and fourth lines of Table 6indicates, unreimbursed IR&D
costs are only about one-fifth as large as the value ofprivately-
financed, procurement-related R&D expenditures implied byour model. The
IR&D budget data appear to significantly understatethe extent of private
investment in defense-related R&D.
The model of GRID expenditure in which SALES isdisaggregated into
two components —-(all)government, and nongovernment -—isuseful for
estimating the amount of private R&D investment stimulatedby federal
procurement as a whole. We hypothesize that it is procurementby design
and technical competition that provides thegreatest stimulus to private
R&D investment. As discussed above, we can test thishypothesis by
estimating a version of the model in which government sales iscross-
classified by method of procurement (negotiatedcompetitive vs. other)
and by commodity (R&D vs. other). Beforepresenting these estimates, we
report estimates of models in which government sales is classified bya
single attribute. These estimates are useful forpurposes of comparison
with previous econometric studies of the effect of federalprocurement
on private R&D investment. These studies have focused exclusivelyon
the R&D component of procurement, and have not considered theeffects of
different methods of procuring R&D on private R&D expenditure.
Column 2 of Table 4 displays estimates of the CRD equation in which
government sales is classified into R&D and non—R&D components. In the
case of both the OLS and the IV estimates, the coefficient ongovernment
R&D is not significantly different fromzero, whereas the coefficient on
other government sales is positive and highly significant. OnemightTable 6
Comparison of Estimates of Aggregate CRD Expenditure
Induced by DoD prime Contract Awards with
Total and Unreimbursed IR&D Costs Incurred by Industry
Line Description 1979 1983
(1) Aggregate value of DoD
Prime Contracts Awards 58.5 121.1
(2) Estimated CR11 expenditure
induced by DoD Prime
Contract Awards (.098 *
Line(1)) 5.7 11.9
(3) Total IR&D Costs incurred
by industry 2.1 3.9
(4) Total IR&D Costs incurred
minus DoD and NASA reim-
bursements 1.3 2.3*
*Estimated
Sources: Line (1): see Table 1.
Lines (3), (4): Science Indicators, 1985, Appendix table 2—16.
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well infer from these estimates that previous studies have beenconcern-
ed with the portion of procurement which has the smaller and lesssigni-
ficant effect on private R&D investment. But before we conclude that
private R&D investment is essentially unresponsive to changes in the ex-
tent of R&D contracting, it behooves us to consider arguments and evi-
dence in support of a subtler hypothesis: that some R&Dprocurement
stimulates, and other R&D procurement depresses, the rate of private R&D
expenditure. The insignificance of R&D procurement in general maybe
masking the offsetting effects of different methods of contracting for
R&D services.
Estimates of the model in which government sales is classifiedby
method of procurement are presented in column 3 of Table 4. In thecase
of both the OLS and IV estimates, the effect of competitive contractsis,
as expected, substantially larger and more significant than the effect of
the other types of contracts. The restriction that the two methods of
procurement have the same effect on private R&D is decisively rejected:
the t-ratio on the difference between competitive and other coefficients
is 3.8 in the case of the OLS estimates and 2.0 in the IV case. The IV
estimate of the coefficient on competitive contracts is about three times
as large as the OLS estimate, and implies 42 cents of private R&D invest-
ment per dollar of competitive awards.
Estimates of the CRD model in which government sales is cross-
classified by method of procurement and by whether or not the contract
is for R&D are presented in column 4 of Table 4. Consider first the OLS
estimates. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient on competi-39
tive R&D contracts has the largest (and a highly significant) coeffici-
ent.22 For thisfinding to be consistent with our earlier finding (in
column 2) that R&D contracting in general has an insignificant effect on
private R&D investment, non-negotiated-competitive R&D contracts should
have a sizable negative effect on CR0. The estimates suggest that this
is indeed the case: the coefficient on this component of government
sales is negative and significantly different from zero. Evidently, the
competitive award of R&D contracts tends to stimulate private R&D invest-
ment, but firms tend to reduce their own R&D spending when the value of
R&D contracts awarded to them on a non-negotiated-competitive basis in-
creases. Non—R&D contracts, on the other hand, appear to have a posi-
tive effect regardless of the method of contracting.
Whereas all of the OLS estimates in column 4 are highly significant-
ly different from zero, the IV estimates are at best only marginally
significant. Presumably, this lack of significance reflects the deterio-
ration in quality (extent of correlation) of the "potential contracts"
variables as instruments for their corresponding "actual contracts"
counterparts as the extent of disaggregation of actual and potential
government sales increases. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the
signs and relative magnitudes of the IV estimates in column 4 are gener-
ally similar to those of the OLS estimates.
22Since about 17percent of competitive non-R&D contracts are
awarded via .DTC, a smaller but positive and significant coefficient on
these contracts conforms with expectations.40
V
Official government statistics on the distribution of the nation's
R&D expenditures by "mission'1 are predicated on theassumption that only
the government sponsors military R&D. But IR&D budgetdata, analyses of
patents, and-anecdotal evidence all suggest that a significant fraction
of company—sponsored R&D expenditure is defense—related. We haveargued
that firms sponsor such research because the governmentdeliberately
provides them with incentives to do so, i.e.
,itestablishes rewards for,
and subsidizes the costs of, private military R&D investment.
Since the government simply contracts with firms to performa
substantial amount of R&D, the question arises why, and under what
circumstances, does the government encourage private R&D investment
rather than (or in addition to) directly contracting for R&D services.
We have provided an explanation for this behavior which is basedon the
notion that the government often has imperfect information about the
ability of various firms to perform R&D and similar contracts involving
great technical uncertainty. In these situations, the government spon-
sors design and technical competitions, which may be interpreted as
solicitations to companies to signal their ability to provide services
and products. Signaling requires considerable R&D investment, which
must be at least partially at firms' own expense for the signal to be
informative.
Estimation of variants of an econometric model of company-sponsored
R&D expenditure enabled us to both test the hypothesis of, and estimate
the quantity of, private investment in signaling R&D. Our estimates
imply that there is about 50 cents worth of private, procurement-related41
("contract—seeking")R&D for every dollar of contract R&D.The amount of
private procurement— (largely defense—) related R&Dexpenditure appears
to be substantially greater than thçreported costs incurred by contrac-
tors under the IR&D program. We estimate thatin 1979 —-beforethe
major defense buildup had begun --about20 percent of private R&D
investment was induced by (related to) federalprocurement. Nearly half
of the increase in company R&Dexpenditure between 1979 and 1984, during
which time federal national defensepurchases grew much more rapidly than
nondefense demand, was stimulated bygrowth in government sales. By
1984, R&D accounted for about 30 percent of
private R&D spending.
According to the official goveinment statistics, the fractionof the
nation's total R&D (company- plusgovernment-sponsored) investment
devoted to military research increased from 23percent in 1979 to 30
percent in 1984. Treating all of the private R&D investmentwe have
estimated to be associated withprocurement as military R&D would in-
crease this share to 32 percent in 1979 and 45percent in 1984. While
this procedure may result in some overstatement ofthe defense share of
R&D, these estimates are, we think, much closer to the truth thanthe
official estimates. The latterappear to substantially overstate U.S.
investmentin R&Drelevantto meeting the challenge posed by competitors
in thecivilian technology race (e.g.,Japan,less than one percent of
whose R&D is military), and to understate investment devotedto meeting
the challenge posed by our major competitor (the SovietUnion) in the
military technology race.42
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